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PROTECTING TAXPAYERS AND CRIME VICTIMS:
THE CASE FOR RESTRICTING UTAH’S PRELIMINARY HEARINGS
TO FELONY OFFENSES
Paul G. Cassell* & Thomas E. Goodwin**
I. INTRODUCTION
When prosecutors file serious criminal charges in Utah, the defendant is
entitled to a preliminary hearing. 1 At this hearing, witnesses will testify and be
cross-examined to determine if the defendant should be bound over to face trial.
For many decades, however, Utah has held such hearings only for felony offenses,
not misdemeanors. 2 In this respect, Utah practice tracked that of the vast majority
of other states, which limit the use of preliminary hearings to more serious felony
crimes.
The reasons for limiting preliminary hearings to more serious felony cases are
easy to understand. Preliminary hearings are costly and time consuming. They can
also burden victims of crime with the need to testify and be cross-examined about
the details of crimes committed against them. These clear costs are not outweighed
by the very limited value that preliminary hearings provide, namely allowing
judicial review of a prosecutor’s evidence. For misdemeanor prosecutions, a judge
can easily decide the question of probable cause based on the information
recounted in the charging document without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Recently Utah suddenly became the only state in the nation to interpret its
constitution to require preliminary hearings for certain classes of misdemeanors. In
State v. Hernandez, 3 the Utah Supreme Court held that for “Class A”
misdemeanors (misdemeanors punishable by up to a year in jail), article I, section
13 of the Utah Constitution required preliminary hearings. 4 Article I, section 13
provides for preliminary hearings for “[o]ffenses heretofore required to be
prosecuted by indictment.” 5 The court concluded that the phrase “offenses
heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment” referred not only to felony
* © 2011 Paul G. Cassell. Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law at
the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah. I thank the Salt Lake District
Attorney’s Office and Rick Schwermer of the Administrative Office of the Courts for
helpful information.
** © 2011 Thomas E. Goodwin. Class of 2012, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney
College of Law.
1
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(h)(1)–(2).
2
See Melinda Rogers, Court: Some Misdemeanors Deserve Preliminary Hearings,
SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2011), www.http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=14302714
&itype=storyID&keyword=&qtype=.
3
State v. Hernandez, No. 20090080, 2011 WL 5343347 (Utah Nov. 8, 2011).
4
Id. at *9.
5
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 13.
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offenses but under Utah’s modern classification of offenses, to Class A
misdemeanors as well. 6
The court’s analytical approach was quite properly historical. The court noted
that the decisive question when interpreting the state constitution is “to ascertain
the drafters’ intent.” 7 Yet strong arguments suggest that the drafters did not truly
intend to require preliminary hearings for Class A misdemeanors. 8 Section 13
appears to refer to federal law that “heretofore” controlled the Territory of Utah.9
At the time the Utah Constitution was drafted, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution directed that capital and infamous crimes—felonies—be screened
through the requirement of a grand jury indictment. 10 The framers of the Utah
Constitution, it can be argued, simply continued this approach and then authorized
a new alternative method for screening such felony prosecutions—a preliminary
hearing instead of a grand jury. This was the argument the state advanced in
Hernandez, although the court ultimately found it unpersuasive. 11
This Article does not debate the historical accuracy of the court’s decision.
Rather, it asks whether the decision is sound public policy. This Article concludes
that requiring preliminary hearings for Class A misdemeanors is undesirable for
two simple reasons. First, the court’s decision will result in hundreds of additional
preliminary hearings a year, thus imposing substantial costs on taxpayers and
burdens on an already overwhelmed criminal justice system. Second, the decision
will create substantial hardships for crime victims, who will now be twice
subjected to cross-examination by defense attorneys—once at the preliminary
hearing and again later at trial. And these costs will generate no significant benefit
in return.
As there is no federal constitutional right at stake, the Hernandez decision
rests solely on an interpretation of the Utah Constitution. 12 The Utah Constitution
can, of course, be amended. Because preliminary hearings in misdemeanor cases
impose significant costs without compensating benefits, the Utah legislature
should send a constitutional amendment to voters to reinstate the modern practice
of providing preliminary hearings only for felonies—a practice that served Utah
well for over thirty years without significant complaint.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of preliminary
hearings and compares Utah’s procedure to other states. Part III reviews the Utah
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Hernandez. Part IV discusses the decision’s
consequences for taxpayers, the criminal justice system, and crime victims.
Finally, Part V advocates a state constitutional amendment to override the
6

Hernandez, 2011 WL 5343347, at *3.
Id. at *2.
8
See generally Brief of Appellee at 14–15, Hernandez, 2011 WL 5343347 (No.
20090080-SC).
9
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 13.
10
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11
Hernandez, 2011 WL 5343347, at *2–3.
12
See, e.g., Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913) (holding that the Due Process
Clause does not require an examination by a magistrate prior to prosecution).
7
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Hernandez decision and restore Utah’s preliminary hearing practice to its historical
form.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PRELIMINARY HEARINGS
A. Screening Charges in the Criminal Justice Process
When a prosecutor alleges that a defendant should be tried for a crime, an
issue arises as to what sort of screening mechanism (if any) should be in place to
evaluate the prosecutor’s allegation before the trial. In the federal system, this
screening function is performed by grand juries. 13 Under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, an indictment is a sufficient basis for binding a defendant
over to face trial. 14 Accordingly, federal prosecutors proceed by way of an
indictment.15 A federal grand jury is comprised of sixteen to twenty-three jurors 16
selected in much the same way a federal trial jury is selected.17 To indict, the
federal system requires twelve affirmative votes. The grand jury, and the grand
jury alone, decides whether there is sufficient evidence to charge a defendant with
a crime. 18
The indictment process implicates the Fifth Amendment, which provides that
“[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” 19 The U.S. Supreme Court
has interpreted “infamous crime” under the Fifth Amendment to require indictment
only for crimes punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary. 20 As a result,
because only those persons sentenced to imprisonment for more than one year—
that is, only felons—can serve time in a penitentiary, the Fifth Amendment does
not require indictment for federal misdemeanors.21 In sum, while federal
constitutional law requires a grand jury indictment for felony cases, it does not
require such grand jury screening for misdemeanors.

13

United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983) (noting the grand
jury’s purpose is to “ferret out crimes deserving of prosecution, or to screen out charges not
warranting prosecution”).
14
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a)(2).
15
In rare situations, a grand jury cannot meet within fourteen days to review charges
against a defendant who has been arrested and is held in custody. In that situation, a federal
prosecutor is required to go through a preliminary hearing to continue to hold the
defendant. See id. at 5.1(c).
16
4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.2(g) (3d ed. 2007).
17
Id. § 15.2(a).
18
See id. § 15.1(d).
19
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20
Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 354 (1886).
21
18 U.S.C. § 4083 (2006) (“A sentence for an offense punishable by imprisonment
for one year or less shall not be served in a penitentiary without the consent of the
defendant.”).
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The practice for screening charges is varied among the states. While the Fifth
Amendment requires grand jury screening of federal felony offenses, the Supreme
Court has not incorporated the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment
as a fundamental right made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 22 Therefore, states (including Utah) are not obligated as a matter of
federal constitutional law to proceed by indictment. Furthermore, because the U.S.
Supreme Court has also held that due process does not require even a neutral
review of the decision to prosecute, 23 states are free to craft their own approaches
to reviewing a prosecutor’s decision to file charges.
In crafting their own approaches, eighteen states have chosen to follow the
federal practice and to require a grand jury indictment for felonies (“indictment
states”). 24 Four states require indictment for only the most serious crimes, such as
capital offenses or crimes punishable by life imprisonment. 25 Twenty-eight states
provide for prosecution by indictment or information 26 (“information states”). 27
Most information and indictment states have chosen to review a prosecutor’s
decision to file charges by holding a preliminary hearing. 28 As the name suggests,
a “preliminary” hearing is a hearing held early in the criminal justice process to
make sure that the prosecution possesses sufficient evidence to warrant binding
over a defendant to face trial.29 Consistent with this screening function, the burden
of proof at a preliminary hearing is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as would
occur at trial, but rather mere probable cause that the suspect has committed the
crime charged. 30

22

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
See Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913) (stating that because the due
process clause “does not require the State to adopt the institution and procedure of a grand
jury, we are unable to see upon what theory it can be held that an examination, or the
opportunity for one, prior to the formal accusation by the district attorney, is obligatory
upon the states”).
24
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 15.1(d) (Alabama, Alaska, Delaware,
Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West
Virginia).
25
Id. § 15.1(e), at 431–32 (Florida, Minnesota, Louisiana, and Rhode Island).
26
An “information” is simply a charging document prepared by a prosecutor.
27
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 15.1(g) n.344 (Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming).
28
See generally infra Part VI. The “common pattern” in indictment states that provide
for preliminary hearings “is to allow bypassing without restriction, as in the Federal
system.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 14.2(c).
29
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 14.1(a).
30
Id.
23
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B. Utah Preliminary Hearings before Hernandez
Utah is an “information state”—that is, it follows the majority of states and
allows the prosecution to proceed to trial not only by way of a grand jury
indictment but also through an information. In some cases, however, Utah requires
that the information itself be further reviewed to determine whether sufficient
evidence underlies it. Indeed, article I, section 13 of Utah’s constitution provides:
“Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted
by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment.” 31 The reference
to cases being prosecuted after “examination and commitment by a magistrate”
establishes the requirement of a preliminary hearing for certain offenses. 32 The
offenses for which preliminary hearings are required are those offenses “heretofore
required to be prosecuted by indictment.” 33
Before the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Hernandez, article I,
section 13 was generally understood to require preliminary hearings only for
felony offenses. 34 This understanding was consistent with the federal approach,
which also required grand jury indictment only for felony offenses.35 For example,
in 1978, the Utah legislature created a new division of responsibility between
circuit courts and district courts. 36 The legislature specifically provided that it was
conferring jurisdiction over Class A misdemeanors to circuit courts, making clear
that this did not carry with it any right to a preliminary hearing in the circuit courts:
All public offenses triable in the district courts, except cases appealed
from justices’ and circuit courts, as well as class A misdemeanors triable
in circuit courts, must be prosecuted by information or indictment[;] . . .
but preliminary hearings shall not be required for class A misdemeanors
triable in circuit courts. 37
31

UTAH CONST. art. I, § 13.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Utah practice has also apparently been to hold a preliminary hearing on
misdemeanors that are charged in the same information as a felony. For example, if a
defendant is charged with aggravated assault against his girlfriend (a felony) and violation
of a protective order (a misdemeanor), the preliminary hearing will usually address both
charges. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 175 P.3d 1029, 1030 (Utah 2007); State v. Harter, 155
P.3d 116, 119 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). This Article sets such “mixed” cases aside, and
focuses on whether there should be a stand-alone right to preliminary hearing when the
information charges only a misdemeanor offense.
35
Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)(1) (stating that felonies must be prosecuted by
indictment) with id. at 58(b)(1) (providing that misdemeanors may be charged with an
information).
36
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16-1 (West 1978).
37
Id.
32
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The understanding that preliminary hearings would not be held for
misdemeanor offenses has also long been reflected in the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which require that “all criminal prosecutions whether for felony,
misdemeanor or infraction shall be commenced by the filing of an information . . .
before a magistrate having jurisdiction of the offense alleged.” 38 Utah law defines
an information as “an accusation, in writing, charging a person with a public
offense.” 39 The information must be “sworn to by a person having reason to
believe the offense has been committed.” 40 Furthermore, in the case of a felony or
Class A misdemeanor, the prosecuting attorney must “first authorize the filing of
[the] information.” 41
Even though Utah had not historically held a preliminary hearing for
misdemeanor charges, it still had a mechanism for reviewing prosecutors’ charging
decisions in such cases. Under the Utah rules, a magistrate reviewed filed
information to determine whether “there [was] probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the accused has committed it.” 42 If probable
cause existed, then the magistrate issued an arrest warrant or summons for the
accused to appear. 43 Then, in the case of a misdemeanor charge, the magistrate
would “call upon the defendant to enter a plea.”44
In contrast, in the case of a felony charge, the magistrate would continue and
inform the defendant of the right to a preliminary hearing. 45 The defendant could
then choose to either waive the preliminary hearing (with the consent of the
prosecutor 46) or set such a hearing. If the defendant requested a preliminary
hearing, the magistrate would schedule the hearing “within a reasonable time, but
not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody for the offense charged and not
later than thirty days if the defendant is not in custody.” 47
Under the Utah rules, the preliminary hearing in felony cases is an adversarial
proceeding. Generally, the hearing parallels a trial: the state must satisfy its burden
to prove the elements of the crime charged and can do so by presenting evidence
and calling witnesses. 48 The defendant can cross-examine the state’s witnesses,
and then present his or her own case by testifying, offering evidence, and calling
defense witnesses. 49 However, the preliminary hearing does not reach the ultimate
question of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, consistent with its function as
38

UTAH R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-3(3) (West 2011).
40
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 4(a).
41
Id. at 5(b).
42
Id. at 6(a).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 7(g).
45
Id. at 7(h)(1).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 7(h)(2).
48
See id. at 7(i)(1).
49
Id.
39
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a screening mechanism, the standard of proof at the hearing is only probable
cause—“a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the
defendant committed it.” 50 Also, the magistrate’s finding of probable cause “may
be based on hearsay in whole or in part,” and the defendant does not have the
opportunity to object to unlawfully obtained evidence. 51 If there is a finding of
probable cause, the magistrate will bind the defendant over for trial; otherwise, the
magistrate must dismiss the charges without prejudice.52
To summarize, before Hernandez, Utah law guaranteed every person accused
of a crime an initial examination of the prosecutor’s evidence by an impartial
judge. However, Utah law extended this additional right for a preliminary hearing
only to those charged with felony offense.
C. Preliminary Hearings in Other States
The Appendix in Part VI of this Article surveys the provisions dealing with
preliminary hearings in the other forty-nine states. From these provisions, it is clear
that a majority of states restrict preliminary hearings to felony charges, just as Utah
did before Hernandez. 53 Some states provide a conditional right to a preliminary
hearing if an indictment or information has not been filed, thus allowing
prosecutors to bypass the preliminary hearing altogether by filing one of these
charging documents. 54 Still other states allow magistrates to make the probable
cause determination without an adversary preliminary hearing by looking at the
evidence in the charging documents and supporting affidavits. 55
Before Hernandez, not one state interpreted its constitution to require
preliminary hearings for misdemeanors. In fact, it appears that only four states—
Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Tennessee—offered a statutory right to
a preliminary hearing for some classifications of misdemeanors. 56

50

State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300, 304 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted).
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(i)(2). For discussion of the reasons underlying this language,
see Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah’s
Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1423–56 (explaining that hearsay
evidence is commonly used in preliminary hearings around the country).
52
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(i)(3).
53
See, e.g., infra Part VI.A (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Hawai’i, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
54
See, e.g., infra Part VI.A (Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, and South Carolina).
55
See, e.g., infra Part VI.A (Arkansas, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana,
Vermont, and Washington).
56
See infra Part VI.B.
51
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III. STATE V. HERNANDEZ
In State v. Hernandez, the defendant asked the Utah Supreme Court to reverse
the long-settled practice in Utah of providing preliminary hearings only for felony
offenses. 57 The case arose from the following facts, recounted in the prosecution’s
criminal information:
On November 24, 2007, Hernandez provided Dillon Whitney, a
minor, and two of Whitney’s friends with alcohol at Hernandez’s
apartment. Whitney drank a large amount of vodka, and became drunk
and “out of it.” The two friends left the apartment for a short time. When
they returned, they found Whitney lying unconscious at the bottom of a
flight of stairs outside the apartment. With Hernandez’s help, the two
friends carried Whitney back into Hernandez’s apartment. Hernandez
then told the friends that they could leave and that he would take care of
Whitney. Whitney was alive at this time.
The next day, Hernandez called the police and reported a man was
“down” outside his apartment. The police responded and found Whitney
unconscious, lying near the top of the stairs in front of Hernandez’s
apartment. Hernandez denied knowing Whitney and lied about whether
Whitney had been inside his (Hernandez’s) apartment. Hernandez
claimed that he found Whitney outside his apartment that morning,
unresponsive and with a bump on his head. Whitney was transported to a
hospital, where he died. The cause of death was blunt force trauma to the
head. The police later found an illegal drug pipe inside Hernandez’s
apartment, which is located within 1000 feet of a school. 58
Prosecutors charged Hernandez in a criminal information with four Class A
misdemeanors: negligent homicide, obstruction of justice, unlawful sale of or
furnishing of alcohol to minors, and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free
zone. 59 Hernandez moved for a preliminary hearing. He conceded that the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure authorized preliminary hearings only for felony
offenses. 60 He argued, however, that article I, section 13 of the state constitution
mandated preliminary hearings not only for felonies but also for Class A
misdemeanors. 61 After the district court denied the motion, Hernandez was
allowed to take an interlocutory appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.62
At the supreme court, the dispute centered on the historical meaning of the
phrase “offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment” in article I,
57

State v. Hernandez, No. 20090080, 2011 WL 5343347, at *1 (Utah Nov. 8, 2011).
Information, State v. Hernandez, No. 071908841 (3d Dist. Ct. Nov. 30, 2007).
59
Id.
60
Brief of Appellee at 3, Hernandez, 2011 WL 5343347 (No. 20090080-SC).
61
Id.
62
Id.
58
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section 13—in other words, “which crimes were required to be prosecuted by
indictment up to the adoption of the Utah Constitution”?63 The supreme court
considered three possible interpretations. First, the district court read the phrase as
referring to specific crimes that were indictable offenses under territorial law.64
However, because Hernandez’s alleged crimes did not exist under territorial law,
his crimes could not have been “indictable offenses” and thus could not now
require a preliminary hearing under article I, section 13. 65 The supreme court
rejected this approach mainly because, under both Utah territorial law and the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, “the question of which offenses were
indictable . . . was not determined by looking to a list of specific offenses.” 66
Rather, under both schemes, “the applicability of the indictment requirement [was]
based on the severity of the punishment rather than on the elements of any
particular offense.” 67
The state offered a second interpretation. Instead of referring to specific
crimes, as the district court found, the state argued that article I, section 13 referred
“only to felony offenses because only felony offenses were required to be
prosecuted by indictment under the federal constitution,” which was binding on the
Utah Territory before statehood. 68 According to this interpretation, article I, section
13 simply “reflects the framers’ intent that felony offenses could [now] be
prosecuted either by way of information or indictment.” 69 In rejecting this
approach, the supreme court recognized that although the federal constitution was
indeed binding on the Utah Territory, the territory was free to provide greater
protection, which it did by extending the right to prosecution by indictment “to
misdemeanors punishable by more than six months in the city or county jail.” 70
In the end, the defense provided the winning interpretation. Hernandez’s
defense attorneys agreed with the state that article I, section 13 did not refer to
specific territorial crimes, as the district court had found. 71 But they argued that the
provision applied to more than just felonies: it applied to that “class of offenses
over which district courts had original jurisdiction under Utah territorial law.”72
Under territorial law, district courts had jurisdiction over “indictable offenses”—
specifically, “crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than six months.” 73
Accordingly, Hernandez argued that, because the Class A misdemeanors he
allegedly committed carried a possible penalty of more than six months in jail, the

63

Hernandez, 2011 WL 5343347, at *2.
Id. at *1.
65
Id.
66
Id. at *6.
67
Id.
68
Id. at *3.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See id. at *1.
72
Id.
73
Id.
64

10

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

Utah Constitution requires prosecution by information and the right to a
preliminary hearing. 74 The supreme court agreed. 75
The state presented an alternative argument to avoid having to provide fullblown preliminary hearings for Class A misdemeanors. It argued that even if
article I, section 13 applies to Class A misdemeanors, the “examination and
commitment by a magistrate” requirement could be satisfied by something less
than the modern preliminary hearing. 76 According to the state, the magistrate’s
review of the information, already mandated by Utah criminal procedure, satisfied
the constitutional requirement.77 The Court again rejected the state’s argument,
concluding that the language of article I, section 13 contemplates a more searching
evidentiary hearing, 78 and, historically, the procedure for prosecuting indictable
offenses in Utah approximates the modern procedure for prosecuting felonies. 79
Thus, the Court held that article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution guarantees
the right to a modern preliminary hearing for Class A misdemeanors. 80
IV. THE UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES OF HERNANDEZ
As mentioned at the outset, the purpose of this Article is not to contest the
merits of the Utah Supreme Court’s historical analysis. 81 Instead, this Article
considers the public policy implications of the court’s holding requiring
preliminary hearings not only for felony cases but also for Class A misdemeanors.
From a cost-benefit perspective, Hernandez imposes significant costs on Utah’s
criminal justice system. The costs fall into two areas: first, burdens on the criminal
justice system in terms of additional expense from holding such hearings; and,
second, burdens on crime victims from having to testify at such hearings. Each of
these costs is discussed in turn below. Of course, it is possible that Hernandez has
compensating benefits that outweighs these costs. The concluding section
considers—and rejects—this possibility.
A. The Fiscal Cost to the System and Taxpayers
The most obvious cost of the Hernandez decision is that it will result in a
substantial number of additional preliminary hearings each year, costing the Utah
criminal justice system and taxpayers alike. While it is too early to give precise
numbers on how Hernandez has played out in the state’s courtrooms, it is possible
to derive a reasonable estimate. As of October 13, 2011, Utah trial courts had

74

Id.
Id. at *7.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at *7–8.
80
Id. at *9.
81
See supra notes 63–80 and accompanying text.
75
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handled 5,410 Class A misdemeanors during the year. 82 Since Hernandez was
decided some six-and-a-half months earlier (covering about 70 percent of the days
in the year), it seems fair to assume that, with a steady calendar, about 70 percent
of these cases were decided after Hernandez. This means that a total of 3,787 Class
A misdemeanors have been processed by Utah’s courts after Hernandez. Of these
cases, 982 were “calendared” for a preliminary hearing—that is, judges reserved
room on their calendars for preliminary hearings. 83 Not every calendared
preliminary hearing is actually held. In many cases, the parties reach some kind of
agreement that eliminates the need for such a hearing. A conservative estimate is
that 30 percent of calendared preliminary hearings are actually held.84 Proceeding
on that basis, so far this year since Hernandez, Utah judges have held 295
preliminary hearings. Because those hearings cover only part of year (the six-anda-half months since Hernandez), an annual figure estimate can be derived by
calculating the number that would be held in a full twelve months—approximately
545 preliminary hearings.
As a cross-check on these numbers, a different calculation method reaches
roughly the same conclusion. The Administrative Office of the Court reports that
prosecutors file about 8,000 Class A misdemeanors in Utah each year.85 Of course,
not every filed misdemeanor charge ultimately leads to a preliminary hearing. In
some cases, a defendant pleads guilty before a preliminary hearing is ever set. In
other cases, the hearing may be set but then waived as part of a plea bargain or
other negotiated process. An estimate of the number of hearings held can be
derived by assuming that the same percentage of misdemeanor cases will go to
preliminary hearing as do felony cases. About 7 to 8 percent of felony cases go to a
preliminary hearing, so, assuming misdemeanors will track felonies, the
expectation is that approximately 7 to 8 percent of the 8,000 Class A
misdemeanors will reach a full preliminary hearing. 86 On this calculation method,
Utah courts should expect to see an additional 560 to 640 preliminary hearings a
year as a result of Hernandez. 87 In summary, both calculation methods produce
roughly the same estimated annual number of additional preliminary hearings of
around 540 to 640.
How much will these additional preliminary hearings cost the courts? The
administrative office estimates that Utah courts currently spend 1,450 hours (or
87,000 minutes) a year holding preliminary hearings. 88 This time costs the courts

82

Telephone Interview with Rick Schwermer, Assistant State Court Adm’r, Utah
Admin. Office of the Courts (Oct. 13, 2011).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Telephone Interview with Rick Schwermer, Assistant State Court Adm’r, Utah
Admin. Office of the Courts (Apr. 25, 2011).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
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approximately $300,000 for judges and support staff.89 Thus, based on these
figures, one minute of preliminary hearing time costs the state roughly $3.40.
Assuming that, on average, a full preliminary hearing requires 90 minutes of
court time, the 545 to 640 additional preliminary hearings required by Hernandez
will cost the courts in the neighborhood of $200,000 per year—$166,700 on the
low end and approximately $217,600 on the high end.
Of course, the financial costs associated with preliminary hearings are not
limited to simply courts (judges and their staffs). Prosecutors must prepare for and
attend preliminary hearings. Unlike a judge who can simply evaluate arguments
presented during the hearing, the prosecutor must prepare to present the case. This
involves subpoenaing witnesses (who must be paid witness fees), meeting with
witnesses to review their testimony, and (of course) presenting the testimony at the
preliminary hearing. Frequently, the prosecutor at a preliminary hearing is assisted
by a “case agent”—that is, by the police officer who has investigated the case. All
of this costs the taxpayers money in some form.
On the defense side of the equation, the defendant is often indigent and
receives court-appointed counsel at state expense.90 The defense attorney must also
prepare for the preliminary hearing, although this may often involve less work than
the prosecutor’s preparation, as defense attorneys need not build an affirmative
case at the preliminary hearing stage. Even so, there are reasons to believe this cost
to defense counsel is significant. Since defense attorney time is a limited resource,
the time defense attorneys spend at preliminary hearings in misdemeanor cases is
necessarily subtracted from other (perhaps more important) work that they might
perform.
While it would be difficult to calculate with precision an exact dollar cost for
all these expenses, it seems reasonable to estimate that these nonjudicial costs for
preliminary hearings would (at least) match the costs to the judiciary. If so, the
total direct financial cost to the state annually from Hernandez is around $400,000.
It is important to understand what this figure means. The $400,000 is simply a
(conservative) estimate of the annual cost to the taxpayers of holding preliminary
hearings for Class A misdemeanors around the state. But the taxpayers did not
suddenly appropriate such a sum the day after the supreme court decided
Hernandez. Instead, judges, prosecutors, and court-appointed defense counsel all
had to divert their time and attention (and judicial funds) away from other matters
to conduct the preliminary hearings mandated by Hernandez. For judges, this has
probably meant delay in resolving other cases. For prosecutors, this has probably
meant fewer cases being prosecuted. And for defense attorneys, this has probably
meant more attention to misdemeanor preliminary hearings and less attention to
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Id.
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, KEEPING DEFENDER
WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 2 (2001) (stating that “in some jurisdictions, public defender
offices are appointed [in] as many as 80 percent of all criminal cases”); see also UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-32-302 (West 2011) (providing counsel for indigent defendants).
90
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other matters. The cost figure derived above is simply a rough, monetized estimate
of how much this diverted time is worth.
B. The Cost to Crime Victims
The “cost” figure from the previous section is simply a rough estimate of the
direct financial costs to the state from the court decision, to say nothing of indirect
costs in time and reprioritization of judicial resources. But other costs need to be
considered in evaluating the wisdom of Hernandez. Perhaps the most significant of
these is the burden to crime victims, who are forced to testify at preliminary
hearings. To be sure, a defendant has a constitutional right to confront witnesses
against him, 91 and crime victims may have to testify at a defendant’s trial. But the
vast majority of criminal cases in Utah (as elsewhere) are resolved by prior
negotiations before trial.92 Accordingly, the vast majority of crime victims will
only have to testify if a preliminary hearing is held in their case.
Testifying at preliminary hearings is often a traumatizing experience for crime
victims, particularly since preliminary hearings are generally held shortly after the
crime was committed when the pain of the experience is still fresh in the victim’s
mind. 93 Indeed, in 1994, Utah voters approved a constitutional amendment
designed to greatly reduce the situations in which crime victims must testify at
preliminary hearings in felony cases.94 Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment
established a series of rights for crime victims in Utah’s criminal justice process,
including the right to be notified of court hearings, to attend those hearings, and to
speak at appropriate points in the process (including hearings involving bail, plea
bargains, and sentencing). 95 One sometimes-overlooked part of the victims’ rights
protections was a provision to allow the use of “reliable hearsay” to establish the
basis for binding over a defendant at the preliminary hearing. 96 The intent of the
drafters of this provision was to reduce the trauma that victims suffer by obviating
the need for them to testify at preliminary hearings.97
The legislative history supporting the provision98 established that testifying at
preliminary hearings can often be traumatic for crime victims in Utah. 99 Trauma
91

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
Empirical Assessment of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 912 (1996)
(reporting that 97% of felony cases sampled in Salt Lake County were resolved before
trial).
93
Cassell, supra note 51, at 1434–36.
94
Id. at 1458–60. As initially drafted, the amendment focused on felony offenses. See
id. at 1421–22. Moreover, at the time the amendment was drafted, preliminary hearings
were not held in misdemeanor cases. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
95
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28.
96
Id. § 12.
97
See Cassell, supra note 51, at 1440–49.
98
The information that follows is drawn from id. at 1434–37, which is endorsed as “a
statement of the drafters’ intentions” for Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment. See id. at
92
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was especially severe for victims of rape and for children who have been sexually
abused. 100 These victims are forced to recount the details of horrible crimes against
them and must endure cross-examination, while the defendant sits nearby as a
threatening presence. 101 For example, a young female victim of sexual assault was
so worried about her testimony at a preliminary hearing that she vomited six times
the night before and then again in the prosecutor’s office. 102 She testified and was
cross-examined for two-and-a-half hours, and was extremely upset throughout. 103
Compounding these problems is fact that there is no jury present at preliminary
hearings. Without a fear of alienating a jury, defense attorneys can conduct
aggressive cross-examination designed to traumatize victims and thus discourage
them from appearing at trial or encourage them to pressure prosecutors to extend a
generous plea offer. 104
While the legislative history from the Victims’ Rights Amendment revolved
around felony cases, the same sorts of harms to victims can be expected to follow
from preliminary hearings in misdemeanor cases. Many significant sex offenses
are Class A misdemeanor offenses. 105 The most serious domestic violence offenses
are also Class A misdemeanors. 106 Prosecutors for these types of cases now face a
serious question: Do they force a victim to undergo the trauma of testifying at a
preliminary hearing or, instead, do they offer a generous plea bargain to a
defendant? Hernandez’s creation of additional preliminary hearings that may
subject victims to increased judicial procedures and more frequent testimony
creates a bargaining chip for defendants that presumably will lead to more
favorable dispositions for defendants than they would otherwise receive.
In addition to the trauma of testifying, there is the general uncertainty
associated with yet another hearing in the process. A concrete illustration of this
concern comes from the impact of Hernandez on a recent case in Salt Lake

1373 n.*. The constitutional amendment was approved by the legislature and then sent to
the voters for their approval.
99
See id. at 1434–35 & n.316 (collecting examples).
100
See id. at 1434–35 & n.319 (collecting examples); see also State v. Kallin, 877
P.2d 138, 144 (Utah 1994) (noting eleven-year-old sexual assault victim in tears for most
of direct and cross-examination at trial).
101
See Cassell, supra note 51, at 1435–36 n.320.
102
Id. at 1435–36.
103
Id. at 1436.
104
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FOUR YEARS LATER: A
REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME 14 (1986), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ovc/102834.pdf (noting at a preliminary hearing “the
defense’s questioning is not restrained by a desire not to alienate the jury, and it is often the
most grueling interrogation of the victim, especially the child victim”).
105
E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401.1 (West 2011) (sexual abuse of minor); id. § 765-401.2 (unlawful sexual contact with persons sixteen or seventeen years old); id. § 76-9702.5 (lewdness involving a child); id. § 76-9-702 (sexual battery).
106
Id. § 76-5-102 (assault); id. § 77-36-2.4 (violation of protective order); id. §76-5106.5 (stalking).
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County. In State v. Druce, 107 the defendant was charged with sexual battery and
assault—both Class A misdemeanors under Utah law—and commission of
domestic violence in the presence of a child.108 After the supreme court handed
down Hernandez, the defendant requested a preliminary hearing. 109 The court
ordered a preliminary hearing. The state moved to dismiss because its witnesses
were unavailable, and the court granted the motion.110 When the state refiled the
charges, there was some internal miscommunication with the misdemeanor
division of the District Attorney’s office, and the prosecutor was late in contacting
the victims. 111 The adult and child victim, it turned out, had moved to South
Dakota. 112 At this same time, the prosecutor received a request from defense
counsel to stipulate to a continuation of the hearing. 113 Given the inability to
subpoena witnesses, the prosecutor left a message agreeing to stipulate but never
heard back. 114 At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel did not request a
continuance after all, and this time the court dismissed the case with prejudice
because the victim did not appear at the hearing. 115
That afternoon, the prosecutor “received a frantic phone call from the victim”
who “had been calling the District Attorney’s office main telephone number but
indicated that she was never transferred . . . to discuss her case.” 116 Ultimately, to
assert her rights, the victim found legal representation from the Utah Crime
Victims’ Legal Clinic, which filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal with
prejudice. 117 The victim argued that her right to be treated fairly was violated by
the dismissal. 118 After a hearing, the judge agreed, granted the motion for
reconsideration, 119 and scheduled a preliminary hearing. 120
It is important to underscore that in this case there was never any real doubt
about the sufficiency of the evidence to support a bindover of the defendant to
stand trial. 121 Thus, this unfortunate case demonstrates both the resources that the
107

Druce, No. 111904859 (3d Dist. Ct. 2011).
Motion for Reconsideration of Court’s Order to Dismiss with Prejudice and
Request for Hearing at 1, Druce, No. 111904859 (3d Dist. Ct. 2011).
109
Id. at 2.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 3.
112
Id. at 4.
113
Id. at 3.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 4.
116
Id.
117
Memorandum in Support of State’s Motion for Reconsideration, Crime Victim’s
Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order at 1, State v. Druce, No. 111904859 (3d Dist. Ct.
2011).
118
Id. at 2.
119
Minutes, Druce (No. 111904859).
120
Id.
121
See Pretrial Protective Order, Druce (No. 111904859). Indeed, following the
preliminary hearing, the judge granted a protective order against the victim “because of the
likelihood of repeated violence.” Id. The defendant was ultimately convicted of two of the
108
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state must now expend, and the aggravation victims must endure, to bind a
misdemeanor case over to trial. Indeed, in this case, the victims (one of whom was
a child) had to travel to Utah from South Dakota to testify at the preliminary
hearing in front of the very person who is charged with abusing them—and for
what possible benefit?
C. The Lack of Compensating Benefits
As the previous sections suggest, Hernandez imposes real costs on Utah’s
criminal justice system. To complete any policy analysis, these costs must be
assessed against any compensating benefits. But the advantages (if any) of
requiring preliminary hearings for misdemeanor are vanishingly thin.
Criminal defendants argue that they receive assistance from the decision,
namely the opportunity to scrutinize charges at a preliminary hearing before they
are forced to stand trial for Class A misdemeanors. But defendants who are
charged with Class A misdemeanors already have review by a magistrate judge of
prosecution’s criminal information.122 The argument that defendants are receiving
noticeable benefits from Hernandez must accordingly rest on the claim that a
preliminary hearing in front of a magistrate is a superior device for screening out
meritless Class A misdemeanor charges.
There are good reasons for doubting any such claim. For starters, Utah has
long restricted preliminary hearings to felonies. 123 It is possible to confirm that
before Hernandez, no preliminary hearings were held for misdemeanors since at
least 1978. 124 In the more than thirty years that Utah operated under this system,
there was no organized effort to change the system (so far as we have been able to
determine). For example, there is no record of any proposed change to the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure or to Utah statutes to make such a change. 125 If
preliminary hearings for misdemeanors were important, one would expect to have
seen some suggestion along these lines before the Hernandez case. To the contrary,
thousands upon thousands of misdemeanor cases moved through the system
without preliminary hearings, all, as the fact that the issue was not litigated in
Utah’s appellate courts for several decades confirms, without documented
complaint.
The experience of other states also supports this conclusion. As noted earlier,
not a single state, other than Utah, interprets its constitution to require preliminary
hearings for misdemeanors. 126 Indeed, only four of the other forty-nine states
three counts against him, domestic violence assault and domestic violence in the presence
of a child (although he was acquitted of sexual battery).
122
See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
123
See Rogers, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
124
See supra notes 36–37; see also Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325, 1325 (Utah
1977) (providing example of a preliminary hearing for defendant charged with Class A
misdemeanor).
125
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
126
See supra Part II.C.
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provide a statutory right to preliminary hearings for some classifications of
misdemeanor offenses. 127 Further, there does not appear to be any apparent
dissatisfaction with this approach in these other states. For example, we have been
unable to find any law review articles or newspaper editorials advocating a change
in the process. 128
In sum, from a public policy perspective, restricting preliminary hearings to
felony cases would simply return the world to the way it was in Utah from (at
least) 1978 through March 29, 2011—and the way it still is in forty-five of the
other forty-nine states. Taxpayers would save money and crime victims would be
spared testifying, all with no apparent harm to any other interest. The question then
arises as to how to implement such a reform.
V. FIXING HERNANDEZ
The solution to the problems created by Hernandez is to simply amend Utah’s
constitution so that it does not require preliminary hearings in misdemeanor cases.
Utah’s constitution provides an amendment process.129 The Utah legislature should
send a one-word constitutional amendment to voters to reinstate the conventional
practice of providing preliminary hearings for felonies only. Article I, section 13 of
the Utah Constitution should be amended by changing one word as follows:
OffensesFelonies heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and
commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the
accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without
such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and
the powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature.
This amendment would limit the requirement for preliminary hearing (or
indictment) to situations involving “felony” offenses. The change would create no
interpretation issues, as the term “felony” is a well-defined term. 130 Of course,
even with this constitutional change, the state legislature would be free to provide
for preliminary hearings in misdemeanors cases through separate legislation if it

127

See supra Part II.C.
But cf. John D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the
Adjudication of Misdemeanors 3 (Washington & Lee Pub. Legal. Stud. Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 2011-19, 2011), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1953880
(exploring adjudication of misdemeanors and arguing that “the procedural safeguards and
due process protections that accompany a criminal prosecution in theory must be applied to
those offenses considered petty just as they are to more serious offenses”).
129
UTAH CONST. art. XXIII.
130
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-103 (West 2011) (defining “felony” offenses under
the Utah Code); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 694 (9th ed. 2009) (defining felony as “serious
crime usu. punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death”).
128
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thought that such a step was appropriate. The proposed amendment simply
eliminates the constitutional requirement for such hearings.
Additionally, the proposed amendment would not have any unpredictable
consequences. To the contrary, it simply returns Utah to the practice that served
the state well for over thirty years without an apparent problem. And as explained
in this Article, such a change would save the state money and spare crime victims
needless trauma. Hopefully the legislature will propose such an amendment at the
earliest opportunity. Both taxpayers and crime victims would benefit as a result.
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APPENDIX
The following is a comprehensive survey undertaken for this Article. It
reveals that the vast majority of states restrict preliminary hearings to felonies.
A. States with No Right to Preliminary Hearings for Misdemeanors
Alabama:
ALA. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a) (“A defendant charged by complaint with the
commission of a felony may . . . demand a preliminary hearing.”).
Alaska:
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 5(e)(2) (“A defendant is entitled to a preliminary
examination if the defendant is charged with a felony for which the defendant has
not been indicted . . . .”).
Arizona:
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a) (outlining timeline for preliminary hearing “[w]hen a
complaint is filed charging the defendant with the commission of a felony”).
Arkansas:
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.3(c) (“[T]he judicial officer shall . . . determine by an
informal, non-adversary hearing whether there is probable cause for detaining the
arrested person pending further proceedings.” (emphasis added)); see also Barber
v. Arkansas, 429 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding there “is no requirement that
a preliminary hearing be afforded to a defendant prosecuted under a felony
information” under Arkansas law); Payne v. State, 295 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Ark.
1956) (holding information need not be quashed because it was issued before a
preliminary hearing), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
California:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 738 (West 2008) (“Before an information is filed there
must be a preliminary examination . . . .”); id. § 737 (“All felonies shall be
prosecuted by indictment or information.”); id. § 740 (“[A]ll misdemeanors . . .
must be prosecuted by written complaint . . . .”).
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Colorado:
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-301(a)(2) (2011) (“Every person accused of a . . .
felony by direct information or felony complaint has the right to demand and
receive a preliminary hearing . . . .”).
Connecticut:
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-46a(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (providing
that no defendant “shall be put to plea or held to trial for any crime punishable by
death or life imprisonment” without a preliminary hearing).
Delaware:
DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 5(d) (providing that a “preliminary examination
shall not be held if the defendant is indicted or if an information against the
defendant is filed . . . .”).
Florida:
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.133(b)(1) (providing a qualified right “to an adversary
preliminary hearing on any felony charge”).
Georgia:
State v. Middlebrooks, 222 S.E.2d 343, 345–46 (Ga. 1976) (holding “that a
preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and that once an
indictment is obtained there is no judicial oversight or review of the decision to
prosecute”).
Hawai‘i:
HAW. R. PEN. P. 5(c) (providing that “a defendant charged with a felony shall
not be called upon to plead” but shall have preliminary hearing in accordance with
this provision).
Idaho:
IDAHO CRIM. R. 5.1(a) (“[A] defendant, when charged in a complaint with
any felony, is entitled to a preliminary hearing.”).
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Illinois:
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/109-3.1(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011)
(requiring either a preliminary examination or an indictment “for the alleged
commission of a felony”).
Indiana:
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-7-2(a) (LexisNexis 1998) (providing that “the facts
upon which the arrest was made shall be submitted to the judicial officer, ex parte,
in a probable cause affidavit” for the judicial officer to determine whether probable
cause exists); see also Flowers v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Ind. 2000)
(finding court lacks authority to dismiss defective probable cause affidavit).
Iowa:
IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.2(4)(a) (requiring a preliminary hearing “unless the
defendant is indicted . . . or a trial information is filed against the defendant”).
Kansas:
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2902(1) (2010) (“The state and every person charged
with a felony shall have a right to a preliminary examination before a magistrate
. . . .”).
Kentucky:
KY. R. CRIM. P. 3.07 (“A defendant who has not been indicted is entitled to a
preliminary hearing . . . when charged with an offense requiring an indictment
. . . .”).
Louisiana:
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 291 (2003) (providing “authority to conduct
preliminary examinations of persons accused of felonies”).
Maine:
ME. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (Class A, B, and C crimes require indictment, unless
waived); id. at 5(a)(2) (Class D and E crimes require probable cause determination
by court according to Rule 4A when arrest is made without warrant); id. at 4A(a)
(requires court to determine whether probable cause exists to believe crime has
been committed). The probable cause determination under Rule 4A does not
appear to be an adversarial preliminary hearing, as the acceptable evidence is
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limited to the sworn complaint, affidavits, and sworn oral statements capable of
review by the court. Id. at 4A(b).
Maryland:
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-221(a) (West 2002) (“A defendant charged
with a felony . . . may request a preliminary hearing . . . .”).
Massachusetts:
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 3(f) (stating defendants charged “with an offense as to
which they have the right to be proceeded against by indictment . . . have the right
to a probable cause hearing, unless an indictment has been returned for the same
offense.”).
Michigan:
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 766.4 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2011) (“[T]he
magistrate before whom any person is arraigned on a charge of having committed
a felony shall set a day for a preliminary examination . . . .”).
Minnesota:
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.03(1) (requiring “a probable cause determination” for
warrantless arrests). A signed complaint establishing the facts of the crime satisfies
the probable cause requirement in Rule 4.03. See Id. at 4.03(3). Minnesota law also
provides for an Omnibus Hearing for those defendants charged with a felony or
gross misdemeanor who do not plead guilty, id. at 11, but the purpose of that
hearing is to prepare for trial, and thus its scope is broader than the traditional
preliminary hearing, see id. at 11.02.
Mississippi:
Mayfield v. State, 612 So.2d 1120, 1129 (Miss. 1992) (holding “that once a
defendant has been indicted by a grand jury, the right to a preliminary hearing is
deemed waived”).
Missouri:
MO. ANN. STAT. § 544.250 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011) (preventing the filing
of “any information charging any person or persons with any felony, until such
person or persons shall first have been accorded the right of a preliminary
examination”).
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Montana:
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-10-105(2)–(3) (2010) (requiring a preliminary
examination unless “the district court has granted leave to file an information” or
“an indictment has been returned”); id. § 46-11-201 (“If it appears [from affidavit]
that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed by the
defendant, the judge or chief justice shall grant leave to file the information . . . .”).
Nebraska:
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-504 (Lexis Nexis 2009) (requiring preliminary
examination “[w]hen the complaint is for a felony”).
New Hampshire:
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 601:1 (2007) (“No person shall be tried for any
offense, the punishment of which may be death or imprisonment for more than one
year, unless upon an indictment . . . .”).
New Jersey:
N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:4-3(a) (requiring probable cause hearing if an indictment
has not been returned).
New Mexico:
State v. Greyeyes, 734 P.2d 789, 792 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (“An accused has
no right to a preliminary hearing on a misdemeanor charge.”).
New York:
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.10(1) (providing that “[u]pon the defendant’s
arraignment . . . upon a felony complaint” the court must inform the defendant of
his right to a hearing to determine the sufficiency of the evidence against him).
North Carolina:
State v. Lester, 240 S.E.2d 391, 396 (N.C. 1978) (holding probable cause
hearing only necessary when “no indictment has been returned by a grand jury”).
North Dakota:
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 5(b)(2) (“If the defendant is charged with a felony, the
magistrate must inform the defendant . . . of the defendant’s right to a preliminary
examination . . . .”).
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Ohio:
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 5(A)(4) (requiring judge or magistrate to inform the
defendant “[o]f his right to a preliminary hearing in a felony case”).
Oklahoma:
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 258 (2003 & Supp. 2012) (“There shall be no
preliminary examinations in misdemeanor cases.”).
Oregon:
OR. REV. STAT. § 135.070(2) (2011) (requiring the magistrate to inform
defendant of the right to a preliminary hearing when the defendant is charged with
“having committed a crime punishable as a felony”).
Rhode Island:
R.I. DIST. R. CRIM. P. 5(c) (requiring a preliminary hearing for defendants
charged with felonies); see id. at 9 (no requirement for preliminary hearing for
defendants charged with misdemeanors).
South Carolina:
S.C. R. CRIM. P. 2(b) (providing that a “[preliminary] hearing shall not be held
. . . if the defendant is indicted by a grand jury”).
Texas:
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 16.01 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (“The
accused in any felony case shall have the right to an examining trial before
indictment in the county having jurisdiction of the offense . . . .”).
Vermont:
VT. R. CRIM. P. 5(c) (requiring a probable cause determination “in the manner
provided . . . for issuance of summons or warrant”).
Virginia:
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-183(B) (2008 & Supp. 2011) (“In felony cases, the
accused shall not be called upon to plead, but he may cross-examine any witness[,]
. . . introduce witnesses in his own behalf, and testify in his own behalf.”).
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Washington:
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 10.37.010 (West 2002) (“No pleading other than
an indictment, information or complaint shall be required on the part of the state in
any criminal proceedings in any court of the state, and when such pleading is in the
manner and form as provided by law the defendant shall be required to plead
thereto as prescribed by law without any further action or proceedings of any kind
on the part of the state.”).
West Virginia:
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-8 (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring those offenses
presented by indictment to be preceded by preliminary examination); id. § 62-2-1
(requiring prosecution of a felony to be by indictment).
Wisconsin:
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.02 (West 1998) (“If the defendant is charged with a
felony in any complaint . . . no information or indictment shall be filed until the
defendant has had a preliminary examination . . . .”).
Wyoming:
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-9-129 (2011) (“Circuit courts have original jurisdiction
in all misdemeanor criminal cases.”); WYO. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a) (“In all cases
required to be tried in the district court, except upon indictment, the defendant
shall be entitled to a preliminary examination . . . .”).
B. States with a Statutory Right to Preliminary Hearings
for Some Classifications of Misdemeanors
Nevada:
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.202 (LexisNexis 2011) (requiring district
attorney to conduct “preliminary examinations where a felony or gross
misdemeanor is charged”).
Pennsylvania:
PA. R. CRIM. P. 540(E)(2) (requiring “issuing authority” to inform defendant
“of the right to have a preliminary hearing”). While this rule does not distinguish
between felonies and misdemeanors, a contact at the Pennsylvania Office of
Attorney General confirmed that the rule applies to misdemeanor defendants.
Telephone Interview with an Attorney at the Pa. Office of Attorney Gen. (Jan. 4,
2012).
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South Dakota:
S.D. R. CRIM. P. 5(c) (“No defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing
unless charged with an offense punishable as a felony or class 1 misdemeanor.”).
Tennessee:
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 5(e)(1) (“Any defendant arrested or served with a criminal
summons prior to indictment or presentment for a misdemeanor or felony . . . is
entitled to a preliminary hearing.”).

